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Secrecy Performance Analysis for TAS-MRC
System with Imperfect Feedback
Jun Xiong, Yanqun Tang, Dongtang Ma, Pei Xiao, and Kai-Kit Wong
Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance
for a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel in
the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. In particular, the
legitimate transmitter uses transmit antenna selection (TAS) to
transmit on a single antenna with the largest signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) while both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
adopt maximal ratio combining (MRC) for reception. We derive
exact closed-form expressions for the probabilities of positive
secrecy rate and secrecy outage with imperfect feedbacks due
to feedback delay and/or error. Furthermore, we derive the
asymptotic secrecy outage probability at high signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) for the transmitter-receiver channel, which accurately
reveals the secrecy diversity loss due to imperfect feedbacks.
Simulation results are provided to verify our analytical results
and illustrate the impacts of imperfect feedback on the secrecy
performance of such a wiretap system.
Index Terms—Antenna selection, Feedback, Physical-layer se-
curity, Secrecy outage probability, Wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
PHYSICAL-layer security (PLS) is an emerging researcharea that aims at developing secure communication sys-
tems by exploiting randomness properties of wireless channels.
It was pioneered in the 1970s by Wyner [1], who introduced
the wiretap channel, and the result was later extended to the
scalar Gaussian wiretap channels [2] and broadcast channels
[3]. In [2], the secrecy capacity was defined as the maximum
rate of communication such that the information can be de-
coded reliably at the legitimate receiver but cannot be inferred
at any positive rate at the eavesdropper. Recently, security in
wiretap channels with multiple antennas has been examined in
several papers. With the additional spatial degrees of freedom
(DoF) provided by multi-antenna systems, the limitation that
the main channel (between the transmitter and the receiver)
could be worse than the eavesdropper channel (between the
transmitter and the eavesdropper) can be overcome. In partic-
ular, the achievable secrecy rate in the Gaussian multiple-input
single-output (MISO) wiretap channel was studied in [4], [5],
which demonstrated that the optimal communication strategy
was beamforming (i.e., the rank of the input covariance matrix
was one). Following further efforts, the secrecy capacity of
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the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap
channel has been fully characterized in [6]–[8].
Achieving the secrecy capacity would require the transmitter
to have precise knowledge of the eavesdropper channel [4]–
[8], which in many cases is infeasible. In this respect, artificial
noise (AN) assisted beamforming, or masked beamforming,
becomes a practical method of providing secure communica-
tions without the knowledge of the eavesdropper channel [9].
In masked beamforming, the transmitter allocates a fraction of
its power to confuse the eavesdropper in addition to transmit-
ting the information-bearing signal [10]. However, imprecise
knowledge of the main channel will cause interference leakage
to the legitimate receiver when AN is used. In order to
address this problem, a robust beamforming was proposed
in [11] to minimize the transmit power for guaranteeing a
prespecified signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) for
the legitimate receiver. In addition, instead of full channel state
information (CSI) of the main channel back to the transmitter,
[12] analyzed the secrecy performance of codebook beam-
forming transmission based on limited CSI feedback.
Although these beamforming or precoding schemes in [9]–
[12] lessen the requirement of the knowledge of the eaves-
dropper channel, the problem of requiring the entire or partial
CSI of the main channel at the transmitter (e.g., full CSI for
masked beamforming [9], [10] and the channel estimate for
robust beamforming [11]) remains, which incurs high feedback
overhead from the legitimate receiver to the transmitter. On
the other hand, the front-end architecture and radio frequency
(RF) section of multi-antenna nodes are highly complex and
expensive. One effective remedy is to use transmit antenna
selection (TAS) and/or maximal-ratio combining (MRC) re-
ception, which offers a good trade-off between complexity
and performance [13]. The TAS scheme requires only a single
RF chain to reduce cost, complexity and size considerably.
Furthermore, only dlogNte bits are necessary to be fed back
from the legitimate receiver to the transmitter.
Without secrecy, the advantage of spatial diversity for TAS-
MRC schemes has been well understood in [14]–[16], where
the receiver selects the transmit antenna according to a certain
criterion (e.g., maximizing the received signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR)), and the optimal antenna index is then fed back to
the transmitter. In practice, the feedback may be outdated
and/or in error. The effects of time-delayed feedbacks on TAS-
MRC schemes were investigated in [14], [15]. The results were
recently extended to Nakagami-m fading channels in [16] and
closed-form symbol error rate (SER) expressions were derived.
In recent years, there has also been great interest on TAS-
MRC for secure communications in the presence of a single-
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or multi-antenna eavesdropper [17]–[24]. In [17], the secrecy
outage probability for MRC and selection combining (SC)
at the eavesdropper was compared. It was shown that SC at
one multi-antenna eavesdropper will have the same effect as
that at multiple non-colluding single-antenna eavesdroppers.
Moreover, [18] considered MRC at both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper, and derived closed-form expressions
for the probability of non-zero secrecy rate and the secrecy
outage probability. The impact of correlation for a single-input
multiple-output (SIMO) system using MRC was analyzed in
[19]. Results illustrate that antenna correlation at the receiver
will severely degrade the secrecy performance, especially in
the low average channel gain regime. In addition, the secrecy
performance for MIMO wiretap channels with orthogonal
space-time block codes (OSTBCs) and arbitrary antenna cor-
relation was also analyzed in [20]. In [21], [22], TAS was
considered to improve the secrecy performance over Rayleigh
and Nakagami-m fading channels, respectively. Both MRC
and SC at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
were studied in [22]. The derived asymptotic secrecy outage
probability indicated that the secrecy diversity order was the
same as that without secrecy and independent of the number
of the eavesdropper’s antennas. [23] examined the impact of
antenna correlation for MIMO wiretap channels in which the
transmitter used TAS while both the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper used MRC. More recently, [24] proposed the
TAS at the transmitter and the generalized selection combining
(GSC) at the receiver to enhance secure communications.
The operation of TAS requires feedback from the receiver
to the transmitter but the limitation of the analysis in [17]–
[24] is that such feedback is assumed delay- and error-free,
as such, the transmitter can always select the optimal antenna.
However, perfect feedback is impossible in practical systems,
and the feedback is usually imperfect [14]–[16]. In this paper,
we study the impact of imperfect feedbacks on the secrecy
performance for the MIMO wiretap channel in the presence
of a multi-antenna eavesdropper, in which, similar to [23], the
transmitter selects a single antenna to maximize the SNR at the
receiver, and both the receiver and the eavesdropper employ
MRC. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
 Without secrecy, the SER for the TAS-MRC scheme with
imperfect feedbacks has been well studied in [16]. The
effect of outdated CSI on the secrecy outage probability
for a MISO wiretap channel in the presence of a single-
antenna eavesdropper with TAS scheme was also inves-
tigated recently in [25], where the exact and asymptotic
expressions for secrecy outage probability were derived.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, the effect of
imperfect feedbacks on the secrecy performance for the
TAS-MRC scheme in a general MIMO wiretap channel
has not been addressed in the literature. Following the
similar line of [16], our work in this paper fills this gap.
 We derive new closed-form expressions for the probabil-
ity of non-zero secrecy rate and the secrecy outage prob-
ability when separately and jointly considering feedback
delay and feedback errors. Our results encompass existing
results with perfect feedback as special cases.
Alice
Bob
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Feedback Channel
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Selection
?
?
Fig. 1. A TAS system in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper.
 Further, we provide asymptotic analysis for the secrecy
outage probability at high SNRs for the main channel. It
is demonstrated that with perfect feedbacks, the TAS-
MRC scheme can achieve the same secrecy diversity
order as that in the non-security setting, i.e., NtNr, where
Nt and Nr denote the numbers of transmit antennas
and receive antennas, respectively. However, when the
feedbacks are outdated and/or in error, the diversity gain
from TAS will disappear and only the MRC diversity at
the receiver side can be realized, i.e., the secrecy diversity
order becomes Nr. Interestingly, it can be found that the
secrecy diversity order is independent of the number of
the eavesdropper’s antennas Ne, which only affects the
secrecy array gain.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the system model of the TAS-MRCMIMO wiretap
channel. In Section III, we study the effect of time-delayed
feedbacks while Section IV investigates the secrecy perfor-
mance with erroneous feedbacks. We characterize the secrecy
performance when both feedback delays and feedback errors
are present in Section V. Simulation results are presented in
Section VI, and we conclude the paper in Section VII.
Notations—Upper case and lower case bold letters denote
matrices and column vectors, respectively. Efg denotes sta-
tistical expectation while Prfg denotes the probability of an
input event. Also, kak returns the Frobenious norm of vector
a. We use IN to denote an N  N identity matrix. The set
of all N -dimensional complex vectors is denoted by CN , and
x  CN (0; 2IN ) means that x is a random vector following
a complex circular Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
covariance 2IN . dxe denotes the closest integer not less than
x and all logarithms are base-2 unless otherwise indicated.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
A. System model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a MIMO wiretap channel
with an Nt-antenna transmitter (named Alice), an Nr-antenna
intended receiver (Bob), and also an Ne-antenna eavesdropper
(Eve). We denote the main channel and the eavesdropper
channel, respectively, by H 2 CNrNt , and G 2 CNeNt ,
whose elements are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) complex Gaussian random variables. Furthermore, the
main channel and the eavesdropper channel are independent
of each other.
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We assume that the CSI of the eavesdropper channel is not
available to both Alice and Bob, i.e., a passive eavesdropper.
The overall TAS-MRC scheme is carried out in two phases.
 TAS Phase: Since Alice has only a single RF chain, it
has to send pilot sequence one by one for the channel
estimation at Bob. Furthermore, we assume that Bob can
perfectly estimate the CSI corresponding to each trans-
mit antenna. After that, Bob selects a transmit antenna
associated with the best instantaneous SNR, and feeds
back the optimal antenna index to Alice. The feedback
information can be represented by a binary vector with
B = dlogNte bits.
 Transmission Phase: During the information transmis-
sion, the CSI corresponding to the optimal antenna should
be estimated again for decoding at Bob. Using the pilot
sequence designed in the information block, Bob can
obtain the accurate CSI of the main channel. Then, Bob
requires to feed back the instantaneous SNR of the main
channel to Alice for wiretap code construction. 1
Since the eavesdropper channel is not available, the TAS
criterion used is to select the highest post-processing SNR for
Bob, which is entirely determined by the CSI of the main
channel. As such, the index of the selected antenna, u, is
determined by
u = arg max
1uNt
kH(u)k; (1)
where H (u) corresponds to the uth column of H.
Nevertheless, from Eve’s point of view, the optimum TAS
scheme for Bob will be a random TAS, as the main channel
and the eavesdropper channel are uncorrelated. Consequently,
the TAS scheme will provide the diversity gain to Bob but not
to Eve; secure communications can thus be realized.
Alice encodes each message w into a codeword x =
[x(1); x(2);    ; x(n)], where n is the length of x, and the
transmitted codeword is subject to an average power constraint
1
n
Pn
i=1 Efjx(i)j2g  P . The received signals at Bob and Eve
at time i are, respectively, written as
y(i) = hx(i) + nb; (2)
z(i) = gx(i) + ne; (3)
where h denotes theNr1 vector for the main channelH(u),
and g denotes the Ne1 vector for the eavesdropper channel
between the uth transmit antenna at Alice and Eve, i.e., g ,
G(u). Also, nb and ne are additive white complex Gaussian
noise at Bob and Eve, respectively. We assume that nb 
CN (0; 2b INr ), ne  CN (0; 2eINe).
We consider the MRC reception scheme to be employed at
both Bob and Eve since MRC always outperforms other diver-
sity combining schemes [26].2 As a result, the instantaneous
1Different from the conventional TAS-MRC scheme without secrecy con-
sideration, Bob has to feed back the received SNR value to Alice for wiretap
code construction, in addition to the optimal transmit antenna index.
2SC employed at the eavesdropper was also considered in [22]. In this
case, the TAS-MRC scheme has a better secrecy performance than that of
MRC scheme at the eavesdropper. However, in this paper, to highlight the
impact of imperfect feedbacks on the secrecy performance, we assume that
the eavesdropper has a higher computational capability, i.e., MRC scheme is
adopted at the eavesdropper. The secrecy performance analysis for the SC
reception scheme at the eavesdropper can be conducted in a similar manner.
SNRs of the main channel and the eavesdropper channel can
be, respectively, given by
m =
khk2P
2b
; (4)
w =
kgk2P
2e
: (5)
The achievable secrecy rate Rs can be expressed as [27]
Rs =

Rm  Rw; if m > w;
0; if m  w; (6)
where Rm , log (1 + m) and Rw , log (1 + w) are the
achievable instantaneous rates at Bob and Eve, respectively.
B. Preliminaries
The secrecy performance of TAS/MRC-based PLS scheme
for MIMO wiretap channels with perfect feedbacks has been
studied in the literature, e.g., [22]. With perfect feedbacks, it
is well known that the probability density function (pdf) of
the SNR for the main channel m, denoted by f(m), follows
the ordered 2 distribution, given by [16]
f (m) =
Nt
(Nr   1)!

Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i

exp

  (i+ 1) m
m


i(Nr 1)X
j=0
ji

1
m
j+Nr
j+Nr 1m ; (7)
where ji =
Pb
x=a
x(i 1)
(j x)! , with a = maxf0; j   (Nr   1)g,
b = minfj; (i  1) (Nr   1)g, j0 = 0i = 1, j1 = 1j! , and
1i = i, and m = P2b
is the average SNR per receive antenna.
In addition, when TAS is not employed at the transmitter
(i.e., Nt = 1), the pdf and cumulative distribution function
(cdf) of the SNR at the MRC combiner output, denoted p ()
and P (), respectively, are reduced to [15]8>>>><>>>>:
p () =
Nr 1
(Nr   1)!

1

Nr
exp

 


;
P () =
 

Nr;



(Nr   1)! ;
(8)
where   (a; x) =
R x
0
ta 1e tdt denotes the lower incomplete
Gamma function.
Using (8), the pdf of w, denoted by f (w), is [21]
f (w) =
Ne 1w
(Ne   1)!

1
w
Ne
exp

 w
w

; (9)
where w = P2e denotes the average SNR per receive antenna
for the eavesdropper channel.
In this TAS-MRC scheme, due to the absence of the Eve’s
channel knowledge, Alice will transmit at an arbitrary rate R0.
For passive eavesdroppers, the wiretap code construction at
Alice is based on the main channel capacity Rm and R0. The
estimate of the eavesdropper’s channel capacity is assumed as
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R^w = Rm   R0 [17], [24]. Therefore, if R0 < Rs, or the
eavesdropper’s channel is worse than Alice’s estimate, i.e.,
Rw < R^w, perfect secrecy can thus be obtained. Otherwise,
if R0 > Rs, then Rw > R^w and such transmission may
not be secure, leading to secrecy outage. Here, we consider
the scenario in which the feedback of the optimal transmit
antenna index is outdated and/or erroneous, and as such,
the transmitter may not select the optimal antenna. In the
subsequent sections, we will find new closed-form expressions
for the probability of non-zero secrecy rate and secrecy outage
probability when separately and jointly considering time-
delayed feedback and erroneous feedback. Based on those
exact expressions, asymptotic analysis is carried out, which
completely characterizes the impacts of imperfect feedback
on the secrecy performance.
III. PERFORMANCE WITH TIME-DELAYED FEEDBACK
In practical systems, TAS phase may exceed the coherent
time of the channel. As a result, the main channel may have
already changed the moment when Alice receives the feedback
of the optimal antenna index because of the time-varying
nature of the wireless channel. In this case, the optimal antenna
is selected based on outdated CSI. Let h(n  ) denote the 
time-delayed main channel version of the current CSI h(n).
We adopt the Gauss-Markov fading model to characterize the
relationship between h(n  ) and h(n) [28], i.e.,
h(n) =
p
h(n  ) +
p
1  e(n); (10)
where e(n)  CN (0; INr ) is the channel error vector, which is
independent of h(n  ), and p is the correlation coefficient
between h(n) and h(n   ), which is given by p =
J0 (2fd), where J0 () is the zeroth-order Bessel function
of the first kind, and fd denotes the Doppler frequency.
Further, let m denote the time-delayed version of the
current SNR ~m, i.e., ~m = kh(n)k2P=2b and m =
kh(n  )k2P=2b . Note that the pdf of ~m, denoted by
f (~m), can be expressed as [16], [25]
f (~m) =
Z 1
0
p (~mjm) f (m) dm; (11)
where p (~mjm) denotes the pdf of ~m conditioned on m,
and ~m and m are two correlated 2-distributed random
variables. According to [29], the conditional pdf is given by
p (~mjm) = 1
(1  )

1
m

~m
m
Nr 1
2
 exp

  m + ~m
(1  ) m

INr 1

2
p
m~m
(1  ) m

; (12)
where Iv () is the modified Bessel function of the first kind
with the order of v, and the correlation coefficient  is given
by  = J20 (2fd).
Substituting (12) into (11), we can obtain the pdf of ~m as
f (~m) =
Nt
(Nr   1)!

Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i

exp

  (i+ 1) ~m
(i (1  ) + 1) m


i(Nr 1)X
j=0
(
ji (j +Nr   1)!
jX
k=0

j
k

1
m
k+Nr
 
k (1  )j k
(i (1  ) + 1)j+k+Nr
~k+Nr 1m
(k +Nr   1)!
)
: (13)
When  = 1, it corresponds to the case  = 0, i.e., perfect
feedback without delay and that (13) boils down to (7).
In addition, an important problem is the construction of
wiretap code in the case of time-delayed feedback. To con-
struct the corresponding wiretap code, Bob has to feed back
the current SNR value ~m to Alice during transmission phase.
We assume that the feedback of ~m is perfect. Thus, Alice
will use the main channel capacity of Rm = log(1 + ~m)
to construct the wiretap code and transmit the signal at the
antenna selected based on h(n   ) [25]. Next, we will
characterize the impact of the nonoptimal antenna selection
caused by time-delayed feedback on the secrecy performance.
A. The probability of non-zero secrecy rate
According to (6), the probability of non-zero secrecy rate
can be expressed as
~Pnon = PrfRs > 0g = Prf~m > wg
=
Z 1
0
Z ~m
0
f (w) f (~m) dwd~m
=
Z 1
0
Z ~m
0
f (w) dw| {z }
P1
f (~m) d~m:
(14)
Using the following identity [30, (3.351.1)],
Z u
0
xn exp ( x) dx = n!
n+1
  exp ( u)
nX
k=0
n!
k!
uk
n k+1
;
(15)
the inner integral of (14) can be expressed as
P1 =
Z ~m
0
f (w) dw = 1  exp

  ~m
w
Ne 1X
k=0
1
k!

~m
w
k
:
(16)
Now, substituting (16) into (14), and using the identity [30,
(3.351.3)], Z 1
0
xn exp ( x) dx = n!
n+1
; (17)
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we have
~Pnon =
Z 1
0
P1f (~m) d~m
= 1  Nt
(Nr   1)!
Ne 1X
k=0
Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i


i(Nr 1)X
j=0
(
ji (j +Nr   1)!
jX
n=0

k + n+Nr   1
k



j
n

n (1  )j n
(i (1  ) + 1)j k
km
n+Nr
w
k+n+Nr
)
;
(18)
where  = (i (1  ) + 1) m + (i+ 1) w.
Note that  = 1 corresponds to the case of perfect feedback.
In this case, the probability of non-zero secrecy rate in (18)
reduces to
Pnon = 1  Nt
(Nr   1)!
Ne 1X
k=0
Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i

i(Nr 1)X
j=0

ji
(k + j +Nr   1)!
k!
km
j+Nr
w
k+j+Nr

; (19)
where  = m + (i+ 1) w.
In addition, if  = 0 in (18), then the current channel will
be fully independent of the channel the moment Bob selects
transmit antenna, and Alice will select an arbitrary antenna to
transmit data. In this case, the probability of non-zero secrecy
rate of the random TAS scheme can be expressed as
Pnon = 1  Nt
(Nr   1)!
Ne 1X
k=0

k +Nr   1
k

km
Nr
w
(m + w)
k+Nr
Nt 1X
i=0
8<:( 1)i

Nt   1
i
 i(Nr 1)X
j=0
ji
(j +Nr   1)!
(i+ 1)
j+Nr
9=;
= 1 
Ne 1X
k=0

Nr + k   1
k

km
Nr
w
(m + w)
k+Nr
:
(20)
Remark 1: In the case of single transmit antenna, i.e., Nt =
1, the corresponding probability of non-zero secrecy rate can
be obtained from (19) as
Pnon = 1 
Ne 1X
k=0

Nr + k   1
k

km
Nr
w
(m + w)
k+Nr
: (21)
This concurs with the result in [18, (3)], i.e., the MRC scheme
with perfect feedbacks. Moreover, it can be observed that the
probability of non-zero secrecy rate in (21) is equal to that of
the random TAS in (20), which means that when  = 0, the
random TAS scheme cannot obtain any secrecy performance
gain. In other words, when the feedback of the optimal antenna
index is severely outdated (i.e.,  = 0), the gain from TAS
vanishes.
Remark 2: In the case of single receive antenna, i.e., Nr =
1, the corresponding probability of non-zero secrecy rate can
be obtained from (19) as
Pnon = 1 
NtX
i=0
( 1)i

Nt
i

1 + i
w
m
 Ne
; (22)
which corresponds to [21, (5)], i.e., TAS with perfect feed-
backs. Thus, our results embrace the known results. Further,
with Nt = Nr = Ne = 1, (21) and (22) reduce to [27]
Pnon =
m
(m + w)
: (23)
Remark 3: Now, we derive the asymptotic results for both
the cases when (1) m  w and (2) w  m. From (18),
it follows that when m  w, then we have (24) (see top of
next page), which is anticipated. Similarly, when w  m,
we obtain (25) which is also expected (see top of next page).
From (24) and (25), though the feedback from Bob to Alice
is outdated, the probability of non-zero secrecy rate will still
approach to one as long as the average channel gain of the
main channel is higher than that of the eavesdropper channel.
However, if w  m, a positive probability of non-zero
secrecy rate will be impossible even with perfect feedback.
B. Secrecy outage probability
For a given target secrecy rate R0 > 0, the secrecy outage
probability is formulated as [27]
~"out = PrfRs < R0g
= PrfRm  R0g+ PrfRs < R0; Rm > R0g
= 1 
Z 1
0
Z 1
2R0w+(2R0 1)
f (~m) d~m| {z }
P2
f (w) dw:
(26)
The meaning of (26) is twofold. First, it includes the outage
probability for the case where Alice does not transmit, i.e.,
Rm  R0. It also gives the metric for the case where the
message transmission is not perfectly secure, i.e., there exists
some information leakage to Eve [17], [27].
With some tedious mathematical manipulations, we can
calculate the inner integral P2 as (27), where ^w = 2R0w + 
2R0   1. Furthermore, replacing the value of f (w) and P2,
we obtain the closed-form expression of (26) as (28), where
 = (i+1)(i(1 )+1)m .
Note that when  = 1, it corresponds to the case of perfect
feedback and the secrecy outage probability in (28) is reduced
to (29) with  = i+1m . On the other hand, in the case of  = 0,
the secrecy outage probability is given by (30).
Remark 4: It is also mentioned that the probability of non-
zero secrecy rate ~Pnon can be evaluated via ~Pnon = 1  
~"out(R0 = 0), and the same result can be obtained [23].
Remark 5: In the case of single transmit antenna, i.e., Nt =
1, the secrecy outage probability is derived using (29) as
"out = 1  1
(Ne   1)!
Nr 1X
n=0
1
n!
1
nm
Ne
w
exp

 2
R0   1
m


264 nX
=0

n

 
2R0   1n  2R0 (Ne +    1)!
1
w
+ 2
R0
m
Ne+
375 ; (31)
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~Pnon  1  Nt
(Nr   1)!
Ne 1X
k=0
Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i


i(Nr 1)X
j=0
(
ji (j +Nr   1)!
jX
n=0

k + n+Nr   1
k



j
n

n (1  )j n
(i (1  ) + 1)j+n+Nr

w
m
n+Nr)
= 1 (24)
~Pnon  1  Nt
(Nr   1)!
Ne 1X
k=0
Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i


i(Nr 1)X
j=0
(
ji (j +Nr   1)!
jX
n=0

k + n+Nr   1
k



j
n

n (1  )j n
(i (1  ) + 1)j k
1
(i+ 1)
k+n+Nr

m
w
k)
= 1  Nt
(Nr   1)!
Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i
 i(Nr 1)X
j=0
(
ji  (j +Nr   1)!
(i (1  ) + 1)j
jX
n=0

j
n

n (1  )j n
(i+ 1)
n+Nr
)
= 0
(25)
P2 =
Z 1
^w
f (~m) d~m
=
Nt
(Nr   1)!
Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i


i(Nr 1)X
j=0
(
ji (j +Nr   1)!
jX
k=0

j
k



1
m
k+Nr k (1  )j k
(i (1  ) + 1)j+k+Nr
1
(k +Nr   1)! 
Z 1
^w
~k+Nr 1m exp

  (i+ 1) ~m
(i (1  ) + 1) m

d~m
)
=
Nt
(Nr   1)!
Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i
 i(Nr 1)X
j=0
(
ji (j +Nr   1)!
jX
k=0

j
k

1
m
k+Nr
exp ( ^w)
 
k (1  )j k
(i (1  ) + 1)j+k+Nr
k+Nr 1X
n=0
1
n!
^nw
k+Nr n
)
;
(27)
~"out = 1  Nt
(Nr   1)! (Ne   1)!
Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i


i(Nr 1)X
j=0
(
ji (j +Nr   1)!
jX
k=0

j
k
 k+Nr 1X
n=0
1
n!
 
k (1  )j k
(i (1  ) + 1)j+n
exp
    2R0   1
(i+ 1)
k+Nr n
1
nm
Ne
w

264 nX
=0

n

 
2R0   1n  2R0 (Ne +    1)!
1
w
+ 2R0
Ne+
375
9>=>; ; (28)
"out = 1  Nt
(Nr   1)! (Ne   1)!
Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i 

Nt   1
i
 i(Nr 1)X
j=0
(
ji (j +Nr   1)!

j+Nr 1X
n=0
1
n!
exp
    2R0   1
(i+ 1)
j+Nr n nm
Ne
w
"
nX
=0

n


  2R0   1n  2R0 (Ne +    1)!
1
w
+ 2R0
Ne+
375); (29)
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"out = 1  Nt
(Nr   1)! (Ne   1)!
Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i


i(Nr 1)X
j=0
8><>:ji (j +Nr   1)!(i+ 1)j+Nr
Nr 1X
n=0
1
n!
exp

 2R0 1m

nm
Ne
w
264 nX
=0

n

 
2R0   1n  2R0 (Ne +    1)!
1
w
+ 2
R0
m
Ne+
375
9>=>;
= 1  1
(Ne   1)!
Nr 1X
n=0
1
n!
1
nm
Ne
w
exp

 2
R0   1
m
264 nX
=0

n

 
2R0   1n  2R0 (Ne +    1)!
1
w
+ 2
R0
m
Ne+
375 (30)
which corresponds to [18, (6)], i.e., MRC with perfect feed-
backs. It can also be found that the secrecy outage probability
of the random TAS scheme is the same as that of Nt = 1. It
infers that when the feedbacks are significantly outdated (i.e.,
 = 0), the diversity gain from the TAS disappears, and only
the MRC diversity at Bob remains.
Remark 6: In the case of single receive antenna, i.e., Nr =
1, the secrecy outage probability can be derived from (29) as
"out =
NtX
i=0
( 1)i

Nt
i

exp

 i2
R0   1
m

i
2R0w
m
+ 1
 Ne
(32)
which aligns with [21, (9)]. For the special case of single
antenna at all nodes, i.e., Nt = Nr = Ne = 1, (31) and (32)
reduce to "out = 1  mm+2R0 w exp

 2R0 1m

[21], [27].
C. Asymptotic outage probability
In the high SNR regime with m ! 1, the asymptotic
secrecy outage probability ~"1out can be expressed as
~"1out = 	
 d
m + o
 
 dm

; (33)
where o() denotes higher order terms. The asymptotic secrecy
outage probability gives valuable insights via the secrecy
diversity order d, which determines the slope of the outage
probability curve, and the secrecy array gain 	, which char-
acterizes the SNR gain relative to the reference curve  dm [22].
Next, we derive asymptotic expressions for the cases  = 1
and  6= 1 to reveal the diversity loss due to outdated feedback
and how the secrecy outage probability behaves at high SNR.
  6= 1: We first expand the exponential function in
(13) using the Taylor series expansion given by e x =P1
k=0( x)k=k!. Then, we only keep the first two terms
and obtain the cdf of ~m as
F (~m) =
Nt
(Nr   1)!
Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i

i(Nr 1)X
j=0
ji
(j +Nr   1)!
Nr!
(1  )j
(i(1  ) + 1)j+Nr
~m
m
Nr
+ o
 
~m
m
Nr!
: (34)
By plugging (34) into (26), the asymptotic expression for
the secrecy outage probability can be rewritten as
~"1out = 	1
 Nr
m + o(
 Nr
m ); (35)
where
	1 =
Nt
Nr!(Nr   1)!(Ne   1)!
Nt 1X
i=0
( 1)i

Nt   1
i

i(Nr 1)X
j=0

ji(j +Nr   1)! (1  )
j
(i(1  ) + 1)j+Nr"
NrX
=0

Nr


(2R0   1)Nr 
2 R0 w
(Ne +    1)!
#)
: (36)
  = 1: Similarly, we obtain the first non-zero order
expansion of the cdf of m from (7) as
F (m) =
1
(Nr!)Nt

m
m
NtNr
+ o
 
m
m
NtNr!
:
(37)
Thus, in this case, the asymptotic secrecy outage proba-
bility can be obtained as
~"1out = 	2
 NtNr
m + o
 
 NtNrm

; (38)
where
	2 =
1
(Nr!)Nt(Ne   1)!"
NtNrX
i=0

NtNr
i

(2R0   1)NtNr i
2 R0i iw
(Ne + i  1)!
#
:
(39)
From above, we can observe that with perfect feedbacks, the
TAS-MRC scheme can obtain the secrecy diversity order of
NtNr. However, when the feedbacks are outdated, the desired
diversity order cannot be realized and only the MRC diversity
gain remains. The secrecy diversity order is independent ofNe,
which only affects the secrecy array gain 	. In addition, using
the inequality (Ne+i 1)!(Ne 1)!  N ie, it can also be inferred that the
secrecy array gain 	1 and 	2 are the monotonously increasing
functions of Ne. Moreover, we assume that the total number of
transmit antenna and receive antenna is fixed, i.e., Nt+Nr =
Ntotal. Thus, an intuitive idea is to allocate the best number of
antennas to Alice and Bob for minimizing the secrecy outage
probability. When  6= 1, we should allocate more antennas to
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Bob, i.e., Nt = 1; Nr = Ntotal   1. However, when  = 1, a
lower bound on the asymptotic secrecy outage probability ~"1out
can be given by ~"1out  1(Nr!)Nt

2R0 1+2R0New
m
NtNr
. We
observe that the first term of the lower bound 1
(Nr!)Nt
stands
in a dominant position at high SNR. Hence, we can minimize
the function 1= [((1  )Ntotal)!]Ntotal to approximately de-
termine the best asymptotic allocation, where  = Nt=Ntotal.
Unfortunately, it is a non-linear function of  and the best
value is dependent on Ntotal. We will carry out numerical
simulations to characterize this analysis in Section VI.
IV. PERFORMANCE WITH ERRONEOUS FEEDBACK
In this section, we consider the case that the feedback of the
optimal antenna index is not outdated, but may be received in
error due to an unreliable feedback channel. In other words,
the coherent time of the main channel is sufficiently great for
TAS phase. The construction of wiretap code at Alice is similar
to Section III. We denote Pe as the probability of a single-bit
feedback error. Without any loss of generality, the number of
transmit antennas is assumed to be equal to the power of two
(i.e., Nt = 2B), the feedback bit-errors are independent, and
then the probability of feedback error, i.e., Alice erroneously
selects any non-optimal transmit antenna for transmission, is
determined by " = 1   (1  Pe)B . Thus, with probability of
1  ", Alice will select correctly the optimal transmit antenna.
However, with probability of ", the feedback from Bob to
Alice will be incorrect and Alice will select a transmit antenna
with its SNR not being the maximum at Bob. In the erroneous
feedback case any non-maximum SNRs will be used with the
equal probability 1=(Nt   1). Using the order statistics [31],
the pdf of a random sample within those (Nt   1) SNRs,
denoted by fc (m), can be derived as
fc (m) =
Nt
Nt   1
Nt 1X
l=1

Nt   1
l   1

p (m)
 [P (m)]l 1 [1  P (m)]Nt l
=
Ntp (m)  f (m)
Nt   1 ;
(40)
where p (m) and P (m) are given by (8), and f (m) is given
by (7). As a result, the pdf of the SNR for the main channel
with erroneous feedback, denoted by f (e) (m), is given as
f (e) (m) = (1  ") f (m) + "fc (m)
= (1  ) f (m) + p (m) ;
(41)
where  , Nt"(Nt 1)
3.
A. The probability of non-zero secrecy rate
It can be seen from (41) that f (e) (m), the pdf of the SNR
with erroneous feedback, is a linear combination of f (m), the
pdf of the TAS/MRC-based SNR with perfect feedback, and
3When Nt = 1, we denote  = 0.
p (m), the pdf of the MRC-based SNR. Thus, the probability
of non-zero secrecy rate with erroneous feedback is found as
P (e)non = Pr fRs > 0g
=
Z 1
0
Z m
0
f (w) f
(e) (m) dwdm
= (1  )
Z 1
0
Z m
0
f (w) f (m) dwdm
+ 
Z 1
0
Z m
0
f (w) p (m) dwdm
= (1  )Pnon (Nt) + Pnon (1) ; (42)
where Pnon (Nt) is given by (19), and Pnon (1) is the special
case of Pnon (Nt) with Nt = 1, given by (21).
Remark 7: From (42), it can be found that the probability
of non-zero secrecy rate is a decreasing function of  since
Pnon (Nt) is always not smaller than Pnon (1). Furthermore,
according to  , Nt"(Nt 1) , it is concluded that the probability of
non-zero secrecy rate decreases with Pe, or erroneous feedback
degrades the secrecy performance.
B. Secrecy outage probability
Similar to the analysis in Section IV-A, the secrecy outage
probability with erroneous feedback can also be expressed
as a linear combination of the secrecy outage probability for
the TAS-MRC scheme with perfect feedback and the secrecy
outage probability for the MRC scheme, i.e., (43), where
"out (Nt) is given by (29), and "out (1) is the special case of
"out (Nt) with Nt = 1, which is obtained in (31).
Remark 8: Note that the secrecy outage probability in (43)
is an increasing function of  because "out (1)  "out (Nt)
always holds, which means that as Pe increases, the secrecy
outage probability will increase. Furthermore, as Pe ! 1, 
will approach one and "(e)out approaches "out (1). It indicates
that the severe feedback errors will cause a secrecy diversity
gain loss and only MRC diversity at Bob can be guaranteed.
Also, as Pe ! 0 and  ! 0, the performance gain from
TAS-MRC can be obtained, as expected.
C. Asymptotic outage probability
Now, we proceed to evaluate the asymptotic expressions
for the secrecy outage probability for the cases Pe = 0 and
Pe 6= 0, respectively.
 Pe = 0: From (43), "
(e)
out = "out (Nt), and hence,
"
(e)1
out = 	2
 NtNr
m + o(
 NtNr
m ); (44)
where the secrecy array gain 	2 is given in (39).
 Pe 6= 0: Since the first term in (43) can introduce the
secrecy diversity order of NtNr as shown in the case
of Pe = 0, the secrecy diversity order is expected to be
between NtNr and Nr in the low to middle SNR regime.
However, as m ! 1, the second term will be more
dominating at high SNRs. Thus, the asymptotic secrecy
outage probability can be written as
"
(e)1
out = 	3
 Nr
m + o(
 Nr
m ); (45)
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"
(e)
out = 1 
Z 1
0
Z 1
2R0w+(2R0 1)
f (e) (m) f (w) dmdw
= (1  )
"
1 
Z 1
0
Z 1
2R0w+(2R0 1)
f (m) f (w) dmdw
#
+ 
"
1 
Z 1
0
Z 1
2R0w+(2R0 1)
p (m) f (w) dmdw
#
= (1  ) "out (Nt) + "out (1) ;
(43)
where
	3 =

Nr!(Ne   1)!"
NrX
i=0

Nr
i

(2R0   1)Nr i
2 R0i iw
(Ne + i  1)!
#
: (46)
In addition, in order to more clearly characterize the change
of the diversity order from low to middle SNRs, we can
express the asymptotic secrecy outage probability as
"
(e)1
out = 	4
 Nr
m + o(
 Nr
m ); (47)
where 	4 = 	3 + (1  )	2 Ntm .
Notably, we can conclude that the expected diversity order
of NtNr cannot be realized with erroneous feedbacks, and
only the diversity order of Nr remains. In addition, it is men-
tioned that similar to Section III-C, the asymptotic allocation
of a fixed number of antennas Ntotal between Alice and Bob
can also be established for Pe = 0 and Pe 6= 0, respectively.
V. PERFORMANCE WITH BOTH TIME-DELAYED AND
ERRONEOUS FEEDBACKS
In this section, we analyze the secrecy performance of the
TAS-MRC scheme when both feedback delays and errors are
present. With probability of 1 ", the feedback of the optimal
antenna index is decoded correctly. However, the feedback is
also delayed by  , and therefore Alice selects the transmit
antenna corresponding to the delayed version of the maximum
SNR. On the other hand, with probability of ", the feedback
Alice receives is decoded erroneously. Using the induced order
statistics [31], the pdf of the delayed version of the non-
maximum SNR, denoted by fc (~m), can be expressed as [16]
fc (~m) =
Z 1
0
p (~mjm) fc (m) dm
=
Ntp (~m)  f (~m)
Nt   1 ;
(48)
where p (~m) corresponds to the special case of f (~m) with
Nt = 1, and fc (m) is given by (40).
As such, the pdf of the SNR for the main channel with con-
sideration of feedback errors and delays, denoted by f (e) (~m),
is given as
f (e) (~m) = (1  ") f (~m) + "fc (~m)
= (1  ) f (~m) + p (~m) ;
(49)
where  is defined in (41). We can observe that p (~m) =
p (m) and p (m) is given by (8), which is expected since if
no TAS is employed, i.e., Nt = 1, the feedback delay will not
affect the pdf of the SNR for the TAS-based scheme.
A. The probability of non-zero secrecy rate
From (49), we also observe that f (e) (~m), the pdf of the
SNR with both time-delayed and erroneous feedbacks, can be
expressed as a linear combination of f (~m), the pdf of the
SNR for the TAS/MRC-based scheme with time-delayed feed-
backs, and p (m), the pdf of the MRC-based SNR. Similar
to the analysis presented in Section IV-A, the probability of
non-zero secrecy rate with outdated and erroneous feedbacks
can be expressed as a linear combination of the probability of
non-zero secrecy rate for the TAS/MRC-based scheme with
outdated feedbacks and the probability of non-zero secrecy
rate for the MRC-based scheme. That is,
~P (e)non = Pr fRs > 0g
=
Z 1
0
Z ~m
0
f (w) f
(e) (~m) dwd~m
= (1  )
Z 1
0
Z ~m
0
f (w) f (~m) dwd~m
+ 
Z 1
0
Z ~m
0
f (w) p (~m) dwd~m
= (1  ) ~Pnon (Nt) +  ~Pnon (1) ; (50)
where ~Pnon (Nt) is given by (18). Likewise, ~Pnon (1) is the
special case of ~Pnon (Nt) with Nt = 1 and given by (21).
Remark 9: As in Remark 1, when  = 0, the probability of
non-zero secrecy rate for the TAS/MRC-based scheme with
time-delayed feedbacks is the same as that of Nt = 1, i.e.,
~Pnon (Nt) = ~Pnon (1) = Pnon (1). Thus, (50) reduces to ~P
(e)
non =
Pnon (1), meaning that when  = 0, the probability of non-zero
secrecy rate will be independent of Pe.
B. Secrecy outage probability
The secrecy outage probability with both outdated and erro-
neous feedbacks can also be expressed as a linear combination
of the secrecy outage probability for the TAS/MRC-based
scheme with outdated feedbacks and the secrecy outage prob-
ability for the MRC-based scheme, i.e., (51), where ~"out (Nt)
is given by (28) and ~"out (1) is the special case of ~"out (Nt)
with Nt = 1 and ~"out (1) = "out (1).
Remark 10: As in Remark 5, in the case of  = 0, the
secrecy outage probability for the TAS/MRC-based scheme
with time-delayed feedbacks is the same as that of Nt = 1,
i.e., ~"out (Nt) = ~"out (1) = "out (1). Similarly, (51) reduces to
~"
(e)
out = "out (1), and therefore the secrecy outage probability
will also be independent of Pe when  = 0. As expected,
as Pe ! 1, ~"(e)out will approach "out (1), which means that
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~"
(e)
out = 1 
Z 1
0
Z 1
2R0w+(2R0 1)
f (e) (~m) f (w) d~mdw
= (1  )
"
1 
Z 1
0
Z 1
2R0w+(2R0 1)
f (~m) f (w) d~mdw
#
+ 
"
1 
Z 1
0
Z 1
2R0w+(2R0 1)
p (~m) f (w) d~mdw
#
= (1  ) ~"out (Nt) + ~"out (1) ;
(51)
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Fig. 2. The probability of non-zero secrecy rate versus the average SNR for
the main channel m with different correlation coefficients  when Nt = 4,
Nr = 1, Ne = f2; 4g, and w = 0 dB.
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Eq. (28)
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ρ = 1
Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus the average SNR for the main
channel m with different correlation coefficients  when Nt = 4, Nr = 2,
Ne = 2, R0 = 1 bits/s/Hz, and w = 0 dB.
the TAS/MRC-based scheme degenerates to the MRC-based
scheme and only the MRC diversity gain can be obtained.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Secrecy performance
In this section, we present numerical results to examine the
effect of imperfect feedbacks on secrecy performance. In all
the figures, the solid and dash lines represent numerical results
using the closed-form expressions derived and the marks show
the simulation results. As we can see, our analytical results all
match perfectly with the simulations.
−10 −5 0 5 10 15 20
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10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
γ¯m [dB]
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Eq. (42)
Pe = 0
Pe = 0.1
Pe = 0.5
Pe = 0.8
N
e
 = 4
N
e
 = 2
Fig. 4. The probability of non-zero secrecy rate versus the average SNR for
the main channel m with different Pe when Nt = 4, Nr = 1, Ne = f2; 4g,
and w = 0 dB.
Fig. 2 shows the probability of non-zero secrecy rate in (18)
versus m. Results illustrate that for a fixed w, Pr fRs > 0g
increases with m and as m ! 1, Pr fRs > 0g will
approach one even when feedback experiences a time-delay.
Moreover, Pr fRs > 0g will decrease with an increase in the
number of the eavesdropper’s antennas Ne. It is obvious that
delayed feedbacks have detrimental effects on the secrecy
performance, the larger the delay (i.e. smaller value of ),
the smaller the probability of non-zero secrecy rate. We also
observe that as  increases, the secrecy performance can be
enhanced. As shown in (20), a non-zero secrecy rate would
exist even when the current channel is fully independent of
the channel associated with the selected index, i.e.,  = 0.
In Fig. 3, results are provided for the secrecy outage
probability using (28) and the asymptotic outage probability
versus m. As can be seen, the asymptotic curves are very tight
with the analytical ones at high SNRs and feedback delays
have a significant impact on the secrecy outage probability.
Results show that the loss of the secrecy outage performance
due to feedback delays is especially obvious at high m, which
causes the secrecy diversity loss. It is illustrated that when
 6= 1, as m ! 1, the gain from TAS will eliminate and
only the MRC diversity gain remains.
Figs. 4 and 5 study the effect of erroneous feedbacks on the
secrecy performance using the analytical results (42) and (43),
respectively. In the simulations, we assume that the feedback
bits undergo a binary symmetric channel with error probability
Pe, which introduces a bit error with probability Pe and treats
each bit independently. As shown in Fig. 4, the probability
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability versus the average SNR for the main
channel m with different Pe when Nt = 4, Nr = 2, Ne = 2, R0 =
0:5 bits/s/Hz, and w = 0 dB.
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Fig. 6. Secrecy outage probability versus Pe and  when Nt = 4, Nr = 1,
Ne = 2, R0 = 0:5 bits/s/Hz, m = 20 dB, and w = 0 dB.
of non-zero secrecy rate reduces as Pe increases. Although
there exists erroneous feedbacks, Pr fRs > 0g will approach
one as m ! 1. The secrecy outage probability and the
asymptotic outage probability versus m are shown in Fig. 5
for various Pe. It can be seen that the erroneous feedbacks have
a significant effect on the secrecy outage diversity, especially
in high m. When Pe 6= 0, the diversity gain from TAS
disappears and the receiver only obtains the MRC diversity
gain. Also, the secrecy array gain 	4 shows that the secrecy
diversity order changes from NtNr to Nr. It can be seen that
as m ! 1, the second term in (43) is more dominating in
the high SNR regime; thus 	4 approaches 	3, as expected.
Fig. 6 presents the secrecy outage probability results (51)
when both time-delayed feedbacks and erroneous feedbacks
are considered. We observe that when  = 0, i.e., random an-
tenna selection, the secrecy outage probability is independent
of Pe. A similar result can also be observed in Fig. 7, where
w = m=10. This corresponds to the case where the power at
the transmitter increases, and w increases with m. It can be
seen that at very low SNR, the secrecy outage probability is
close to one, which means that we cannot expect any secrecy.
As expected, the time-delayed and erroneous feedbacks have
significant effects on the secrecy outage performance.
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Fig. 7. Secrecy outage probability versus the average SNR for the main
channel m with different Pe and  when Nt = 4, Nr = 1, Ne = 2,
R0 = 0:5 bits/s/Hz, and w = 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Fig. 8. The effect of 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 when Ntotal = 10, Ne = f2; 4g, R0 = 5 bits/s/Hz, m = 25 dB, and
w = 0 dB.
Fig. 8 characterizes the effects of  = Nt=Ntotal on the
secrecy outage probability with Ntotal = 10. When  6= 1 or
Pe 6= 0, more antennas should be allocated to Bob, i.e., the
best allocation to minimize the secrecy outage probability is
 = 0:1 (Nt = 1). However, when  = 1 and Pe = 0, the
best  is between 0:3 and 0:4. As analyzed in Section III-C,
we can adopt the function 1=(Nr!)Nt to replace the secrecy
outage probability. The value of 1=(Nr!)Nt is also drawn in
this figure. It can be found that the trends of the secrecy outage
probability and the approximate function 1=(Nr!)Nt versus 
match each other reasonably well.
B. Comparison with other schemes
For the typical passive eavesdropping scenario (in which
the transmitter does not know the eavesdropper’s channel),
the masked beamforming method proposed in [9] and the
codebook-based beamforming (CB) method proposed in [12]
are two effective schemes to enhance secure communications.
In this subsection, we compare the TAS-MRC with these
schemes. For the sake of a fair comparison, we consider
Nr = 1, i.e., MISO wiretap channels. The transmitted signal
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for the masked beamforming is given as [9]
x =
p
P ts+
p
(1  )Pz; (52)
where s is the data symbol with Efjsj2g = 1, t represents the
normalized beamforming vector with ktk = 1, and z is the
AN vector with Rz = Efzzyg and tracefRzg = 1. Also, 
denotes the transmit power allocation parameter between data
and AN, 0    1, and P is the total transmit power.
According to [9], [10], the transmitter should choose the
beamforming vector t as the principal eigenvector t1 which
corresponds to the largest eigenvalue of hhy, and the AN
vector z can be expressed as a linear combination of the
remaining Nt   1 eigenvectors, i.e, z lies in the nullspace
of hy. In addition, when  = 1, the masked beamforming
scheme reduces to the naive beamforming (NB) scheme, i.e.,
no AN is used.
For CB, the received signals at legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper can be expressed, respectively, as [12]
y =
p
Phyqx+ nb;
z =
p
PGqx+ ne;
(53)
where q = argmaxci2C jhycij is the selected codeword, and
C = fc1; c2;    ; cNg is a pre-designed codebook of N unit
norm vectors, which is known to all parties (including the
eavesdropper). Thus, the corresponding index of q should be
fed back to the transmitter.
We apply two different codebooks for comparison. For N =
4, we will design a codebook using the Generalized Lloyd
Algorithm (GLA) (also known as LBG algorithm) presented
in [32], where the minimum distance between different codes
wi and wj is  =
q
1  jwyiwj j2 = 0:9999. For N = 16,
we will use a Grassmannian codebook proposed in [33]. Thus,
the feedbacks of 2 and 4 bits are necessary for the codebook
sizes N = 4 and N = 16, respectively.
Fig. 9 compares the secrecy outage probability of the TAS-
MRC scheme to other schemes, assuming m = 15 dB and
w = 0 dB. As we can see, when the normalized delay fd is
very small, the performance of ‘MB’ (masked beamforming)
is much better than the others. However, when the channel
is severely outdated, i.e., fd is large, the performance of
‘MB’ significantly degrades because of noise leakage caused
by imperfect CSI for the main channel. In addition, as fd
decreases, the performance of ‘MB,  = 0:9’ is much better
than ‘MB,  = 0:5’ while ‘MB,  = 0:5’ performs better
when fd is large. From the above simulation, we can obtain
the following facts about ‘MB’:
1) If the main channel is perfectly known at the transmitter,
AN can be made invisible to the legitimate receiver but
only degrading the eavesdropper’s reception. However, the
imprecise knowledge of the main channel will cause noise
leakage, thus significantly degrading the secrecy performance.
2) The performance of ‘MB’ largely depends on how well
the power is allocated between the signal and the AN. As fd
decreases ( ! 1), we should use more power to transmit
the AN. However, most power should be used to transmit the
signal if the CSI of the main channel is severely outdated.
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Fig. 9. Secrecy outage probability versus the normalized delay fd when
Nt = 4, Nr = 1, Ne = 2, R0 = 1 bits/s/Hz, m = 15 dB, and w = 0 dB.
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Fig. 10. Secrecy outage probability versus the average SNR for the main
channel m with different Pe when Nt = 4, Nr = 1, Ne = 2, R0 =
1 bits/s/Hz, and w = 0 dB.
From the figure we can also see that the ‘CB, N = 16’
and ’NB’ schemes outperform TAS-MRC. However, in the
‘NB’ scheme, Bob should transmit the complete CSI to Alice,
requiring in theory an unlimited amount of feedback, while in
the ’CB, N = 16’ scheme, the amount of feedback information
is B = dlogNe = 4 bits. The proposed TAS-MRC scheme
only requires a B = dlogNte = 2-bit feedback. In other
words, when the feedback rate is fixed, the ‘NB’ and ‘CB,
N = 16’ schemes would introduce a larger feedback delay
compared with TAS-MRC.
Moreover, Fig. 10 compares the secrecy outage probability
of the TAS-MRC scheme to the ‘CB, N = 4’ and ‘CB, N =
16’ schemes in presence of erroneous feedbacks. As shown,
with perfect feedbacks, i.e., Pe = 0, the secrecy performance
of the ‘CB, N = 16’ scheme is better than that of the TAS-
MRC scheme. However, the ‘CB, N = 16’ scheme requires
higher feedback load, i.e., B = 4 bits, thus causing higher
feedback error than that of the TAS-MRC scheme according
to " = 1  (1  Pe)B . It can be found that when Pe = 0:01,
there exists a crossover point of m. Above this point, the
TAS-MRC scheme outperforms the ‘CB, N = 16’, which
enhances the robustness to the feedback errors. In addition,
from Figs. 9 and 10, we can find that the ‘CB, N = 4’
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TABLE I
COMPARISON WITH OTHER SCHEMES
NB MB,  = 0:5 MB,  = 0:9 CB, N = 4 CB, N = 16 TAS-MRC
Number of RF Chains 4 4 4 4 4 1
Number of Feedback Bits* 1 1 1 2 4 2
SOP**
fd = 10
 3; m = 15 dB 8:96 10 5 1:54 10 5 3:38 10 5 1:41 10 3 3:85 10 4 1:41 10 3
fd = 1; m = 15 dB 0:125 0:778 0:476 0:136 0:132 0:136
Pe = 0:01; m = 5 dB       0:375 0:248 0:375
Pe = 0:01; m = 15 dB       5:16 10 3 6:52 10 3 5:16 10 3
Pe = 0; m = 5 dB       0:366 0:226 0:366
Pe = 0; m = 15 dB       1:41 10 3 3:64 10 4 1:41 10 3
*The number of feedback bits does not include the feedback of SNR value. **’SOP’ denotes the secrecy outage probability.
obtains the same secrecy performance as that of the TAS-
MRC scheme. Although the feedback requirement is also
B = 2 bits for the ‘CB, N = 4’ scheme, the TAS-MRC
only requires a single RF chain, which effectively reduces the
system’s complexity. The overall comparison of these schemes
in different scenarios is summarized in Table I, where Nt = 4,
Nr = 1, Ne = 2, R0 = 1 bits/s/Hz, and w = 0 dB.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied the effects of imperfect feedback on the
secrecy performance of MIMO wiretap channels with TAS
at the transmitter and MRC at both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper. Time-delayed feedback and erroneous
feedback were separately and jointly considered. We derived
exact closed-form expressions for the probability of non-zero
secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability. Our model pro-
vides useful insight into the secrecy performance in practical
environments when time-delayed and/or erroneous feedbacks
are present. Our analysis is general and encompasses the
existing results as special cases. Specially, our asymptotic
expressions revealed that imperfect feedbacks significantly
degrade the secrecy performance and when the feedbacks are
outdated and/or erroneous, the expected secrecy diversity order
ofNtNr cannot be realized at high SNRs for the main channel.
The secrecy diversity order is not affected by Ne.
REFERENCES
[1] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8,
pp. 1355–1367, Oct. 1975.
[2] S. K. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. E. Hellman, “The Gaussian wiretap
channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 451–456, Jul.
1978.
[3] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, “Broadcast channels with confidential mes-
sages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, May 1978.
[4] S. Shafiee and S. Ulukus, “Achievable rates in Gaussian MISO channels
with secrecy constraints,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Sym. Inf. Theory, pp. 2466–
2470, Jun. 2007, Nice, France.
[5] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple
antennas–Part I: The MISOME wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 56, no. 7, pp. 3088–3104, Jul. 2010.
[6] T. Liu and S. Shamai, “A note on the secrecy capacity of the multiple
antenna wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 55, no. 96, pp.
2547–2553, Nov. 2009.
[7] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple
antennas–Part II: The MIMOME wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 56, no. 11, pp. 5515–5532, Nov. 2010.
[8] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap
channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 4961–4972, Aug.
2011.
[9] S. Goel and R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artificial noise,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 2180–2189, Jun. 2008.
[10] J. Xiong, K. K. Wong, D. Ma, and J. Wei, “A closed-form power
allocation for minimizing secrecy outage probability for MISO wiretap
channels via masked beamforming,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 16, no. 9,
pp. 1496–1499, Sep. 2012.
[11] A. Mukherjee and A. L. Swindlehurst, “Robust beamforming for security
in MIMO wiretap channels with imperfect CSI,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 351–361, Jan. 2011.
[12] S. Bashar, Z. Ding, and Y. G. Li, “On secrecy of codebook-based
transmission beamforming under receriver limited feedback,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 1212–1223, Apr. 2011.
[13] S. Sanayei and A. Nosratinia, “Antenna selection in MIMO systems,”
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 42, no. 10, pp. 68–73, 2004.
[14] T. Skinner and J. Cavers, “Selective diversity for Rayleigh fading
channels with a feedback link,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 21, no.
2, pp. 117–126, Feb. 1973.
[15] S. Thoen, L. V. Perre, B. Gyselinckx, and M. Engels, “Performance anal-
ysis of combined transmit-SC/receive-MRC,” IEEE Trans. Commun.,
vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 5–8, Jan. 2001.
[16] J. Tang and X. Zhang, “Transmit selection diversity with maximal-
ratio combining for multicarrier DS-CDMA wireless networks over
Nakagami-m fading channels,” IEEE J. Select. Commun., vol. 24, no. 1,
pp. 104–112, Jan. 2006.
[17] V. U. Prabhu and M. R. D. Rodrigues, “On wireless channels with M -
antenna eavesdroppers: characterization of the outage probability and
"-outage secrecy capacity,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 6,
no. 3, pp. 853–860, Sep. 2011.
[18] F. M. He, H. Man, and W. Wang, “Maximal ratio diversity combining
enhanced security,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 509–511,
May 2011.
[19] M. Z. I. Sarkar and T. Rarnarajah, “Enhancing security in correlated
channel with maximal ratio combining diversity,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 60, no. 12, pp. 6745–6751, Dec. 2012.
[20] N. S. Ferdinand, D. B. da Costa, and M. Latva-aho, “Physical layer
security in MIMO OSTBC line-of-sight wiretap channels with arbitrary
transmit/receive antenna correlation,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett.,
accepted for publication.
[21] H. Alves, R. D. Souza, M. Debbah, and M. Bennis, “Performance of
transmit antenna selection physical layer security schemes,” IEEE Signal
Process. Lett., vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 372–375, Jun. 2012.
[22] N. Yang, P. L. Yeoh, M. Elkashlan, R. Schober, and I. B. Collings,
“Transmit antenna selection for security enhancement in MIMO wiretap
channels,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 144–154, Jan. 2013.
[23] N. Yang, H. A. Suraweera, I. B. Collings, and C. Yuen, “Physical
layer security of TAS/MRC with antenna correlation,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensics Security, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 254–259, Jan. 2013.
[24] N. Yang, P. L. Yeoh, M. Elkashlan, R. Schober, and J. Yuan, “MIMO
wiretap channels: secure transmission using transmit antenna selection
and receive generalized selection combining,” IEEE Commun. Lett.,
vol. 17, no. 9, pp. 1754–1757, Sept. 2013.
[25] N. S. Ferdinand, D. B. da Costa, and M. Latva-aho, “Effects of outdated
CSI on the secrecy performance of MISO wiretap channels with transmit
antenna selection,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 864–867,
May. 2013.
[26] D. G. Brennan,“Linear diversity combining techniques,” Proc. IRE, vol.
46, pp. 1075–1102, Jun. 1959.
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 14
[27] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. Rodrigues, and S. McLaughlin, “Wireless
information-theoretic security,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6,
pp. 2515–2534, Jun. 2008.
[28] C. C. Tan and N. C. Beaulieu, “On first-order Markov modeling for the
Rayleigh fading channel,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 48, no. 12, pp.
2032–2040, Dec. 2000.
[29] M. S. Alouini and A. J. Goldsmith, “Adaptive modulation over Nakaga-
mi fading channels,” Kluwer J. Wireless Commun., vol. 13, pp. 119–143,
May 2000.
[30] I. S. Gradshteyn and I. M. Ryzhik, “Table of integrals, series and
products,” 7th ed. San Diego, CA: academic, 2007.
[31] H. A. David, “Order Statistics,” 2nd ed. New York: Wiley, 1981.
[32] Y. Linde, A. Buzo, R. M. Gray, “An algorithm for vector quantizer
design,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 84–95, Jan. 1980.
[33] Available online: http://engineering.purdue.edu/djlove/grass.html.
